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Part I Introduction 
A Introduction 
The expression "Electronic Funds Transfer Systems'' (EFTS) 
relates to a variety of bookkeeping and paper handling 
operations which have been more or less automated 
using large scale digital computers. The phenomenal 
growth in popularity of the cheque as a means of effecting 
payment has been made possible by, and in turn has been 
the cause of, the automation of the cheque handling 
process. As this automation has progressed, it has 
become clear that the costs of handling the paper 
involved in the cheque system are both large and 
avoidable. Schemes have been devised which would theor-
etically allow the replacement of all paper by electrical 
impulses and magnetic records. 
Whether this "cashless society" is desirable or not is 
an interesting question, 
discussed in this paper. 
1 but not one which will be 
The concern here is a narrower 
one; cheques are a class of bills of exchange and the law 
of such bills has been worked out by the courts, the legis-... ') 
lation, and commercial practice over a period of several 
centuries. To what extent is this developed body of law 
applicable to the new forms of payment? When may such law 
be applied to resolve problems of EFTS and where does such 
application assist or inhibit the development of such systems? 
1. For an interesting popular discussion, see Hendrickson, The 
Cashless Society, New York, 1972. 
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B EFTS in New Zealand 
New Zealand is, perhaps surprisingly, one of the early 
leaders in the development of EFTS. 
2 The Bank of 
New Zealand commenced electronic data processing operations 
in 1966 in the two main North Island centres. The National 
Bank followed soon afterward and, following joint discussions, 
it was decided to use joint computer facilities. In late 
1967, discussions were held with the other three trading 
banks on the feasibility of all banks using joint facilities. 
The outcome was that by November of 1969 every branch of 
the five banks had been converted to computer processing 
at central facilities. 
A company was incorporated under the Companies Act 1955. 
This company, Databank Systems Ltd, has share capital owned 
by the five trading banks in approximate proportion ' to the 
size of the banks. Databank functions essentially as a 
clearing house and bookkeeper for the banks. There is an 
exemption clause in the agreement between Databank and 
each of the trading banks which specifically exempts Databank 
from any liability for failure to provide any of the services 
under the agreement. 
The New Zealand scheme thus preceded the much heralded 
California Automated Clearing House by a full three years. 3 
There are several reasons for this. One, and the most obvious, 
2. The historical material is derived from Databank Systems Ltd 
publications. 
3. For an account of the structure of the California Automated Clearing 
House Association, see Homrighausen, "One Large step towards Less-Check 
The California Automated Cleating House System", 28 Bus Law 1143. 
3 
is that there are only five banks in New Zealand. These 
banks serve a population of only three million, which would 
have made the cost of "going it alone" prohibitive. In 
addition to the high costs of computerisation, there is the 
further very important factor that this high cost is almost 
entirely in foreign exchange. In a country where the balance 
of payments is a problem never far from the public mind, 
this provided a powerful incentive to avoid unnecessary 
duplication. In addition, there was considerable pressure 
on the cheque clearing system. New Zealanders are among 
the most prolific cheque issuers in the world in 1972 
they wrote over 70 cheques per capita and the number of 
cheques was growing at the rate of ten percent per year. 
4 
C EFTS Overseas 
Development overseas, particularly in the United States, 
has also been rapid. In 1968, representatives of ten 
California banks forned the Special Committee on Paperless 
Entries (SCOPE) to discuss the establishment of an 
automated clearing house system. As mentioned above, the 
Californian Automated Clearing House Association began 
operations in late 1972. 
The Americal development, perhaps characteristically, tended 
to elaborate on the technological possibilities of EFTS. 
For example, using the Bell Touch-Tone Telephone System, 
it is possible in some areas to communicate directly with 
the computer to order certain types of transactions. This 
has led to a large measure of consumer resistance in some 
areas. 4 Studies have shown that bank customers have 
rejected some services in favour of retaining cheques, 
even though the new services require less time than writing 
a cheque and even though the transaction is effected more 
cheaply by the new system than by means of a cheque. While 
some of this may be attributed solely to familiarity with 
the cheque system, surveys have found that there are more 
substantial reasons for the resistance. Consumers feel 
that they do not have the same direct control over their 
personal finances. They consider that they have lost the 
4. See, for example, Schuck, "EFT: A Technology in Search of a 
Market", 35 Maryland L. Rev. 74. 
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security of a cancelled cheque as proof that payment has 
been made. They worry that they may no longer stop pay-
ment in the event of an unsatisfactory consumer transaction; 
they do not trust the security of computer held accounts. 
Legislation has been introduced in thirty two of the American 
States to regulate the development of EFTS. 5 These 
laws are generally concerned with questions such as whether 
a remote terminal is a branch bank and whether EFTS facilities 
must be shared with other institutions to prevent unfair 
competition. 6 
Again in the United Sta tes, the National Commission on 
Electronic Funds Transfer recently released its interim 
report. 7 This report emphasises the problems of 
privacy, consumer interests, and the apportionment of 
liability in the event of unauthorised use of the customer's 
account. 
5. Computerworld, August 1, 1977, p.10. 
6. Th e re has been litigation on the question of whether a terminal is 
a branch bank and whether the operator of such a terminal is a 
banker; State ex rel. Meyer v. American Community Stores, 228 N.W. 
2d 299; Independent Bankers Association of America v. Smith 534 
F. 2d 921 (1976). 
7. Report in Computerworld, February 28, 1977, p 1. 
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D The Scope of this Paper 
In this paper, the existing and proposed EFTS in New Zealand 
will be described. An attempt will then be made to identify 
and examine some of the major legal problems which might be 
expected to arise from the operation of the syste~. 
There are two extremely important issues which will not be 
discussed in this paper privacy of customers transactions 
and accounts and the closely related problem of assuring 
that these records cannot be assessed by unauthorised people 
or agencies. 
( 
The privacy question is simply to broad to deal with here; 
I 
its importance must not, however, be ignored or under-
estimated. 8 The Americal National Commission on 
EFTS came to the view that the privacy issue was their 
most important and difficult problem, even though it was 
given low priority at the outset. An appendix is included 
which shows just how offensive, and informative, a total 
record of all transactions can be. 
Security of computer files is too technical to be dealt 
with here. 9 Recent studies have shown that the 
range of frauds perpetrated by unauthorised access to 
computer files is wider than was ima~ined. The short 
truth of the matter is that no security &ystem is secure 
8. For observations on both the privacy and the security issues, 
see Parker, Crime by Computer, New York, 1976. 
9. For a non-technical discussion which indicates the frightening 
scope of the problem, see Nycman, "Security for Electronic 
Funds Transfer Systems", 37 Pitt. L. Rev. 709. See also 
"Computers Raped by Telephone" NYT (Magazine) September 8, 
1974, p.33. 
7 
wires may be tapped, operators bribed, codes may be 
broken(particularly by those who have access, legitimate 
or otherwise, to a computer). Security is a difficult 
issue and one with no apparent total solution. 
8 
Part II The Databank System 
A The Cheque System 
The Databank Cheque system is based upon a Magnetic Ink 
Character Recognition (MIC~ concept. Thus, the vast 
majority of the Databank work is the efficient processing 
of paper. Documents such as cheques and deposit slips 
are pre-encoded with the customer's account number. 
These documents are referred to as "MICR documents" or 
"MICR paper". 
MICR paper must have additional information encoded upon 
it when received by a branch bank. For example, a cheque 
when deposited at the collecting bank of the payee contains 
MICR information concerning the account of the payer and 
identification of the drawee branch, but no information 
relating to the collecting bank or to the amount of the 
cheque. Such additional information is encoded upon the 
cheque in MICR figures either at the branch bank or at 
a regional "proofing" centre. 
The only sorting required of the branch bank is into 
"credit" and "debit" bundles. In the example just 
mentioned, a deposit of a cheque by a customer, the 
cheque would be in the "debit" bundle. There would be 
a corresponding piece of MICR paper representing the 
deposit slip included in the "credit" bundle. 
9 
Each bundle of documents is accompanied by a "batch 
ticket" which is a MICR document prepared by the branch. 
The batch ticket contains information describing the 
contents of the bundle. These batch tickets are used 
by the computer as control documents to cross-reference 
accounts and to provide an "audit trail". 
These debit and credit bundles, together with their 
batch tickets, are taken by courier to the nearest 
Databank centre for processing. These centres convert 
the information on MICR paper into electronic forms and 
transmit the information via data transmission equipment 
to the main processing computer. There are two of these 
larger computers, one in Auckland and one in Wellington. 
If a MICR document relating to an account within the 
''.jurisdiction" of, say, the Northern computer is entered 
by a bank in the Southern area, the document is physically 
transported to its proper home and processed the next day. 
A proposed data transmission link between the two computers 
will eliminate even this delay. 
The information from the MICR documents is processed by 
the computer overnight. Accounts are altered at this tjme. 
The computers prepare reports for the branch banks which 
are ready to be delivered to them the following morning. 
During this second day, the MICR documents are "fine sorted" 
by machine into batches according to their branch destin-
1. Accounts are thus credited and debited very early in the process. 
This has raised some concern with the question of the right of 
banks to later reverse the accounts upon dishonour of a cheque. 
These problems are discussed in Part III. 
1 
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ation; for example, cheques would be placed in batches 
according to the branch upon which they are drawn. On 
the third day, these MICR documents are physically 
transported to the appropriate branches. 
2 
The actual coding and processing in the Databank system 
has several unique features, the most important being the 
use of a single basic code number for each customer wi t h 
varying suffixes used to identify the individual accounts 
of that customer. This permits the system to cross 
reference all accounts held by a given customer. 
The one basic customer number also permits the keeping of 
a Customer Master File. 3 This file contains the 
customer's name and address, occupat i on, and details of 
all the customer's accounts. The account details, in 
addition to balance, include information concerning the 
activity of each account,high and low figures of each 
account since the last review, warning codes to identify 
bad or stopped accounts, various particulars relating to 
overdraft facilities, e.g. securities held, limits, and 
interest rates. The Customer Maste r File also contains 
any details of stopped cheques and a h o st of statistical 
information concerning account activity for bank fee purposes. 
2. Banks claim the right to dishonour until closing time on 
this third day. 
3. In view of the commitment of Databank to the concept of a "cashless" 
society, the contents of this file are of extreme importance in 
any discussion of privacy. The example given in Appendix I shows 
that such a file may potentially be far more of an invasion of 
privacy than the much discussed Wanganui files. 
11 
The one basic customer number approach, together with the 
fact that all branches within the system, also allows all 
of the MICR paper to be processed in a single job stream; 
there is no particular order in which MICR paper must be 
processed by the system. There is no preliminary sorting, 
save for the initial branch division into credit and 
debit bundles. 4 
The basic Databank MICR processing function has undoubt-
edly improved the cheque as a basic method of payment 
in New Zealand society. 5 Even so, the growth in the 
use of cheques threatens to overwhelm the existing systems, 
thus returning to the days when cheques required five days 
or more to clear, or, alternatively, resulting in an 
increase in the cost of the cheque system to unacceptable 
levels. 
4. The practical importance of this is very great : the sorting 
process is very slow in comparison with any other process in 
the entire system. Preliminary sorting would re-introduce 
considerable "float" into the system. 
5. New Zealander's are prolific cheque writers. Recent figures show 
that the number of transactions debited to trading bank customer's 
accounts totalled more than 154 million. 
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B The Elimination of MICR Paper 
A prime goal of the Databank system is to introduce 
services which will stem the growth of the use of MICR 
paper. From the Databank point of view, such paper is 
useful only as a means of entering data into the system. 
6 
As a means of data entry, it is relatively slow, curnbersome, 
and expensive. Databank offers several services which do 
not depend upon MICR paper for data input. These services, 
and proposed services, will be described in this section. 
The legal framework of these systems and the possible 
legal problems raised by the substitution of these systems 
for the cheque system will be discussed in part III of this 
paper. 
The simplest and most obvious possibility is the use of 
direct electronic data processing (EDP) entry into the 
system. Instead of encoding information in magnetic ink 
on paper, this system encodes the information directly onto 
magnetic tape for use by the computer. 
7 In conjunction 
with the money transfer services, to be described, this 
may result in the elimination of a large amount of MICR 
paper when the originator has access to EDP equipment. 
6. As negotiable instruments, the paper is of considerable importance 
in other ways. Certain of the issues raised by the elimination of 
paper are discussed in Part III . 
7. The need for paper handling in the cheque system seems inevitable 
because of the requirement for presentation in s.45 of the Bills 
of Exchange Act 1908. The "truncation" of the cheque system 
would assist in the solution of the paper handling problem, but 
would need to be carefully examined for other effects. 
13 
Government departments are making great use of direct 
EDP entry in the payment of salaries. 
The concept of a money transer system (MTS) as envisaged 
by the Databank system is a broad one; it may be best 
explained by a consideration of one aspect of the cheque 
system. 
If a MICR cheque is considered as a record of a transaction, 
then it is (for the computer) an incomplete record since 
the MICR field contains no information concerning the payee 
or his account; that information is obtained from the MICR 
deposit slip. Thus, in the MICR cheque system, a payment 
record (cheque) does not provide a direct means of conunun-
ication between the a8count of the debtor and that of the 
creditor. Additional information is required to satisfac-
torily complete account settlement. 
The Databank concept of a MTS is that each transaction 
record in a general MTS should contain, in machine read-
able form, at least the names and account information of 
both parties and sufficient information to completely 
settle the transaction accounts between the parties. 
Thus, for example, the transaction record might contain 
the number of an insurance policy in the case of a premium 
payment, or some identification of the conunodity being 
settled. Such information then appears on each customer's 
monthly sta~ement of account . 
14 
Such a general MTS could, of course, be implemented by 
a system based on MICR paper. The Bank Giro system 
in England is an example of such a payments system. 
The main advantage, from the Databank point of view, is 
that such systems may be conveniently implemented without 
the use of MICR documents. 
Current Databank MTS services are an automatic payments 
system and a Direct Credit system. In the near future 
a limited Direct Debit system will be introduced, as will 
an extended Direct Credit scheme to be known as a 
Monthly Accounts scheme. Further in the future, and most 
radical of all, is the point of sale terminal (POS) which 
could conceivably eliminate not only MICR documents, 
but cash as well. 8 Each of these will be described 
briefly here, legal problems and is s ues being deferred 
until Part III. 
The Automatic Payments system and the Direct Credit 
system may, for the purposes of this paper, be viewed 
as automated versions of standing orders and a version of 
a trader's credit system. EDP input to the system is 
encouraged in the case of the Direct Credit system, 
particularly when used to pay wages, salaries, pensions 
or dividends. The customer provides the particulars of 
each payee's account; these accounts are credited at the 
8. And, it should be added, elevate the privacy question to one 
of top priority : see note 3 supra. 
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appropriate date and the customer's account is debited. 
The transactions do not depend upon MICR paper. 
The banks claim the right to revei:se these credit transactions, 
at least for a limited period of time. The legal nature 
of the transactions and the validity of the banks' claim 
will be examined in part III. 
The Direct Debit system is, in a sense, the converse of 
the Direct Credit system. By prior arrangement between 
the creditor and the debtor, the creditor submits the 
details of the payment, including the account particulars 
of both parties, through his, the creditors, bank for 
payment. The scheme is seen as useful for periodical 
payments, particularly when the creditor is large enough 
to have access to EDP for input, such as, for example, 
gas and power payments, subscription fees for clubs and 
magazines, and the like. 
The Direct Debit system is not yet in operation. The 
banks consider that there is a great deal of consumer 
resistance to the idea, and, consequently, that the 
scheme is of limited appeal. 9 When introduced, 
each account could be debited only up to a pre-authorised 
upper limit, a necessary restriction to overcome consumer 
resistance but an administrative nuisance in times of 
rapidly increasing costs, since the authorised upper limit 
9. The Direct Debit system will probably be operational next year,
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would soon be inadequate to cover the payment and new 
authorisation would need to be sought. 
The obvious possibility for abuse of a Direct Debit 
system is minimised by offering the scheme only to 
selected customers, by the pre-authorised upper limit, 
and, possibly, by requiring an indemnity as is done by 
the banks in the Giro system. 
The point-of-sale system (POS), also called a "money key'' 
system, extends the concept of the electronic transfer of 
funds right down to the r etail level. Bank customers 
would hold cards, similar in appearance to ordinary credit 
cards; these cards are intended to identify the customer 
and would p robably be imprinted with a magnetic strip 
containing his account details. 
The retail outlet would have a terminal which was linked 
directly to the Databank central computers. At the time 
of a purchase, the retailer would enter details such as 
price, description of the transaction, date, etc. The 
customer inserts his card and the account of the retailer 
is credited with the amount of the transaction. The 
account of the customer is debited simultaneously. 
Facilities would be provided for holding the transactions 
in suspense, either through the retailer's own credit 
facility or through some other pre-arranged credit source. 
The problems associated with unauthorised use of the card 
are obvious; various devices are proposed to guard against 
17 
such a possibility. The terminals already in use in the 
United States require, in addition to the insertion of 
the customer's card, that the customer enter his personal 
identification number (PIN). The PIN is a secret number 
alloted to the customer; entry of the PIN is by means of 
a keyboard, the "PIN Pad", on the customer's side of the 
terminal. No transaction will occur unless the number 
entered on the PIN pad matches the number allocated to 
the customer whose card is being used. 
More sophisticated means of customer identification have 
been proposed; of these, the use of fingerprints or 
voiceprints probably await only technological advances 
which will allow the identification method to be machine 
cognisable. Until such time, the risks associated with 
the unauthorised use of such cards remain to be allocated 
among the parties either by operation of law or by agreement. 
The risks of unauthorised card use may be reduced somewhat 
by programming the computer to check for unusual activity 
in relation to the use of the card. 
The widespread use of POS terminals raises severe questions 
of policy on matters such as privacy and the rights of 
individuals to hold cards. These questions, while 
fascinating, are beyond the scope of this paper. 
18 
Part III Legal Problems and Issues 
A The Clearing of Cheques 
(1) The Databank in Operation 
There are two fundamentally different systems which might 
be used in the electronic clearing of cheques. In the 
first, the cheques are processed through the computer but 
the transactions are held in suspense for a period of time. 
During this time the cheques are presented for paywent; if 
the cheque is to be paid, no further action is necessary: 
the appropriate accounts are debited and credited at the 
end of the period. If the cheque is to be dishonoured, 
special instructions are dispatched to the computer and 
the accounts are never changed. 
In the second system, the accounts are debited and credited 
at the first instance, prior to presentation for payment. 
In the event of dishonour, the accounts are "reversed", 
i.e., returned to their original position. 
The English system is based upon the first model. 1 
The New Zealand Databank system is of the second type. 
There are two reasons for this. The public explanation 
offered by the banks is that such a system offers better 
customer service : since only a small number of cheques 
1. At least, the English system was originally of this type. The 
system is described in Burnett v. Westminster Bank [1966] 1 Q.B. 742. 
In view of the desire of the banking system to elimate the "float" 
(see note 3 infra) this may have changed. 
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are dishonoured, why should the majority of accounts 
be "penalised" by being held in suspension. 
2 The 
second reason is not as well advertised, but may be the 
more important: the "float" in the second type of 
system is virtually emiminated. 
3 
The precise timing of the operation of the Databank system 
is relevant to the discussion of the issues arising. If 
the day of the cheques being paid into the collecting bank 
is designated as Day 1, then the system proceeds as follows 
the accounts are debited and credited overnight. On Day 2 
the cheques are "fine sorted" according to drawee branch. 
On Day 3 the cheques are delivered to the drawee bank. The 
drawee bank claims the right to dishonour the cheque at 
any time until closing of Day 3. In such a case, the accounts 
would be reversed the night between Day 3 and Day 4. 
Three important issues relating to this system have caused 
concern to bankers. Firstly, and most important, may the 
claimed right of reversal be justified? Secondly, is the 
presentation for payment timely under the system? Thirdly, 
is the actual presentation for payment necessary; could the 
2. This explanation is not entirely convincing. It may be that the 
customer whose account is being debited would not really consider 
a delay to be a penalty. To take this point further, the electronic 
transfer of funds may no-£- necessarily be beneficial for banking 
customers; see the interesting article by Schuck, "EFT: A Technology 
in Search of a Market" (1975) 35 Maryland L. Rev. 74. 
3. The "float" may be most easily illustrated in the case of a cheque 
which is paid out: in cash over the counter of some branch other than 
the drawee bank. Until the accounts are adjusted, i.e., until the 
cheque clears, the banking system as a whole has lost the use of the 
sum, yet still "owes" the sum to the drawer of the cheque. It is 
also the "float" which permits the fraudulent practice of "kiting" 
cheques. 
20 
clearing scheme be safely "truncated"? Each of these will 
be discussed in turn. 
( 2) Reversal of Accounts 
Concern has been expressed in b a nking circles that the 
doctrine in Price v. Neal, 
4 as extended by the decision 
of Matthew J. in London and River Plate Bank v. Bank of 
Liverpool 
5 may operate to deprive the banks of their 
claimed right of reversal. 
The doctrine in Price v. Neal is a doctrine of finality. 
'<.. 
In its narrow form, it states that a drawer of a bill of 
exchange accepts or pays a forged bill at his own peril, 
assuming, of course, that the holder of the bill is an 
innocent party. In somewhat wider form, the doctrine is 
said to apply whenever there is a mistake of fact between 
the two parties. 
With respect, the concern that the doctrine might apply to 
the Databank cheque clearing system seems to be premature. 
The Price v. Neal doctrine, no matter how widely stated, 
comes into operation only if payment has actually been 
made. To worry about Price v. Neal is to assume that 
the initial crediting and debiting of accounts amounts 
to payment of the cheque. 
4. (1762) 3 Burr. 1354 
5. [1896] 1 Q.B. 7. 
> 
' C 
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While it is certainly true that payment may be completed 
by the medium of bookkeeping, 
6 it is by no means 
obvious that every such bookkeeping entry is a final 
payment. In spite of the decision in Capital and Counties 
Bank v. Gordon 7 it may not now be argued that the 
mere crediting of the customer's account makes the bank 
a holder for value. Since Gordon's case, it has been 
held that before the banker can be treated as a holder 
for value, there must be evidence of a binding agreement 
that the customer is entitled to draw upon the amount 
which has been credited in advance of collection; the 
mere fact that he has been credited and allowed to 
draw as a matter of practice is not sufficient evidence. 
It will be argued below 9 that payment is not made 
8 
until a decision is made by the paying bank on Day 3. A 
drawee of a cheque, like that of any other bill of exchange, 
is not liable to pay on the bill until it has been presented 
for payment. An internal system of accounting which operates 
to change the accounts prior to the actual presentation 
should have no bearing on the legal position. The paying 
banker cannot be held liable prior to his decision to pay 
the cheque or until the right to refuse payment is lost 
through lapse of time. If this is correct, then the 
doctrine of Price v. Neal is irrelevant in this context. 
6. Eylis V. Ellis 
7. [1903] A.C. 240 
8. Re Farrow's Bank [1923] 1 Ch. 41; AL Underwood Ltd v. Barclays Bank 
[1924] 3 K.B. 775. 
9. See part Ill . 
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3. The Time of Presentment 
Presentment of cheques, whether governed by section 
45(2) or by section 74(b) of the Bills of Exchange Act 
1908 10 must be made within a reasonable time. 
In determining what is a reasonable time regard shall 
be had to the nature of the instrument, the usage of 
trade and of bankers, and the facts of the particular 
case. 11 Chalmers says that this is a "new and less 
rigorous measure of reasonable time" than the old 
common law rules. 
12 
However, presentment withi n the time prescribed by the 
common law rules would certainly be regarded as reasonable; 
and presentment in violation of those rules might be 
prima facie unreasonable. It is here that concern with 
the Databank operation has been expressed. Under the 
commol law rules, a collecting bank, if in the same place 
as the paying bank, would be required to present the 
cheque for payment the following day, i.e. Day 2 in the 
scheme described at the beginning of this part. 
Actual presen tment is not made until Day 3. 
13 
In view of the express instructions of the Act to have 
regard to banking custom, it is difficult to imagine 
10. As to which, see the discussion in Paget, The Law of Bsnking. 
11. s.74(b), Bills of Exchange Act, 1908. 
12. Chalmers, "On Bills of Exchange", 13th Edition, p 252. 
13. Forman v. Bank of England (1902) 18 T.L.R. 339; Hamilton Finance 
Co Ltd v. Coverby Westray Walbaum and Tosette Ltd, and Portland 
Finance Co Ltd, [1969] 1 Lloyds Rep 53. 
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that any court would hold that presentment is out of time. 
To do so would veto impose an intolerable strain upon 
the cheque system of payments. There is authority for 
the proposition that Clearing-house rules will be given 
the effect of law is necessary : Parr's Bank (Limited) 
v. Thomas Ashby and Co. 
14 There is additional 
evidence to show that the Databank procedure is reasonable. 
In the initial system, the cheques were fine-sorted the 
night between Day 1 and Day 2. The change in the system 
was forced by the sheer increase in volume of the cheques 
being processed. The current system is a creature of 
necessity. One would hope that a court would find it to 
be reasonable. 
( 4) Is Presentment Necessary? 
Various schemes have been suggested for the "truncation" 
of the cheque clearing process. The aim of such schemes 
is to reduce or eliminate the handling and sorting of 
paper, already noted as being the "bottleneck'' in the 
cheque sorting process. All such schemes depend upon a 
simple observation the process of clearing and the 
decision to pay or to dishonour depends only upon the 
information on the cheque, and not at all upon the individual 
piece of paper which is the cheque. 
This information could be transmitted directly from the 
collecting bank to the central computers. From there, 
the relevant information could be transmitted directly 
14. (1898) 14 T.L.R. 563. 
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to the paying bank where the decision to pay or to 
dishonour could be made. All paper movements and all 
paper sorting would be eliminated. 
Unfortunately, even though the individual piece of 
paper is not important for the process, The Bills of 
Exchange Act 1908, and, indeed, the entire commercial 
concept of negotiability, envisages the piece of paper 
as an important source of rights and duties. 
In particular, the Act requires that the cheques be 
"presented" for payment. If it is not, certain rights 
are forfeited. With so much at stake, the banks would 
probably not change the system in the absence of an 
enabling amendment to the Bills of Exchange Act 1908. 
This result is one of the more unfortunate side effects 
15 
of the historical classification of cheques as a particular 
form of bills of exchange. 
(5) Other Problems 
Since additional coding needs to be added to the cheque, 
there is always the possibility of a mistake. In an 
.American case, 16 the collecting bank "under-encoded" 
a cheque, i.e. the coded MICR figure was lower than the 
15. It may be possible to argue that the electro~ transmission of 
information described is "presentment" within the meaning of the 
Act, but the clear intention of the Act makes this a very 
artificial argument. 
16. Georgia Railroad Bank and Trust Co v. The First National Bank and 
Trust Co of Augusta 229 S.E. 2d 501. 
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sum for which the cheque was written. The cheque was 
paid though an automated clearing house according to the 
encoded sum. The mistake came to light some time later 
when the depositor of the cheque unexpectedly found his 
account to be overdrawn. The paying bank resisted the 
claim for the additional sum. While it is difficult to 
imagine New Zealand banks litigating such an issue, there 
can be no doubt that the outcome would be in ~favour of 
the collecting bank, as was the decision in the American 
case. There also would seem to be no doubt that an 
action would lie to recover money paid on an over-encoded 
cheque under similar circumstances, although the right 
to recover may be lost under the usual circumstances. 
The paying bank might also have an action in negligence 
against the encoder of the cheque. Again, it is difficult 
to envisage circumstances in New Zealand where such 
disputes would be litigated. 
In the case where the cheque is encoded by a Databank 
proofing centre, it should be noticed that clause 8 of 
the banks' agreement with Databank specifically exempts 
Databank from liability for failure to provide any of 
the services under the agreement. It is felt that this 
clause could be struck down by the court, but in the 
absence of a liquidation of one of the banks, it is 
difficult to see how this could arise in practice. 
26 
B The Direct Credit System 
(1) Legal Nature 17 
In the Direct Credit System, the debtor issues instructions 
to his bank, either directly or via EDP input to the 
Databank computers, to transfer sums from his account 
to the account of the creditor. There have been no 
decided cases elaborating on the legal repationships of 
the parties involved. The procedure is conceptually 
similar to the Giro system operating in the UK, but 
there are no cases on that system either. 
It is, nevertheless, clear that the relationships are 
governed by the law of contract and of agency. The 
contract between the banks and Databank has been mentioned 
already; its effect would seem to be to make Databank 
agents of the banks for certain purposes. Thus, direct 
EDP input to the Databank computers constitutes, as 
hinted above, directions to the debtor's bank. 
The paying bank is thus given instructions to pay, 
instructions which place the paying banker under a duty 
which appears to be very similar to the duty of a paying 
banker in the case of a cheque. He is, thus, presumably 
under a duty to follow the terms of the mandate strictly, 
and would be liable to the customer for loss arising 
17. I am indebted to Professor E P Ellinger for many of the obser-
vations and arguments of this section. They will appear, with 
considerably greater clarity, in the next edition of Chitty on Contracts. 
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from a failure to follow this mandate. The customer is 
under a duty similar to that of the drawer of a cheque. 
Interesting questions might arise concerning the prep-
aration of EDP input, but they would be questions of 
fact and of the technical standard to be followed; they 
woulJ pose no novel legal problems. For example, if a 
computer tape is prepared and handled in such a way that 
alteration by an employee is facilitated, there seems no 
reason to suppose that MacMillan's case 
apply to make the customer liable. 
18 would not 
The banker to whom the funds are transferred, i.e., the 
creditor's banker, is called the recipient banker. The 
recipient banker must be the agent of the creditor. He 
is given authority to recieve payment on behalf of the 
creditor via the Databank system. 
When the paying bank and the recipient bank are one and 
the same, the bank must be the agent of both debtor and 
creditor. This raises some fine points concerning the 
time at which the debtor's right of revocation of the 
mandate is lost. This problem, closely related to the 
bank's right to reverse the accounts, will be discussed 
presently. 19 
(2) An Assignment? 
Chorley 20 argues that the legal nature of the Giro 
18. London Joint Stock Bank v. MacMillan [1918) A.C. 777. 
19. Part C, below. 
20. Chorley, The Law of Banking. 
I 
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transaction is one of assignment of a debt. Because of 
the similarity of the Databank Direct Credit system, it 
may be supposed that the same argument would be made 
here. The argument is a natural one on a functional view 
of the transaction, a debtor D owes a debt to a creditor 
C. At the same time, a banker P (the paying banker) owes 
a debt to D. At the termination of the transaction, 
the recipient banker R owes a debt to C, but D does not. 
At a functional level, a debt appears to have been 
transferred; in our law, the means of transferring a debt 
are limited; 21 since the entire tra nsaction occurs 
by the issuing of instructions, it is natural to attempt 
the conceptual analysis by resort to the law of assign-
ment. Indeed, it may be difficult to distinguish 
factually an order to pay from an assignment of funds. 
22 
However, there are compelling arguments against considering 
either the Giro transaction or the Databank Direct Credit 
system as an assignment. Perhaps the most telling 
argument is that all of the parties to the transaction 
would be startled at the consequences of considering the 
Direct Credit to be an assignment. It would, for example, 
place the payee in a stronger position than if he were 
paid by cheque, for he could maintain an action directly 
against the paying banker. It would mean that the instructions 
to the paying banker would be irrevocable once the creditor 
21. Halsbury's, The Law of England, Article entitled Chases in Action, 
para 10. 
22. Halsbury's, The Law of England, Article entitled Chases in Action, 
paras 38, 39. 
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had notice of such instructions, a result which is clearly 
not intended by the parties. It would mean that payment 
would not be completed until the payee received notice; 
in many cases that would presumably not be until he 
read his monthly statement. 
These results, clearly not contemplated by any of the 
parties to the transfer scheme, seem to conclusively 
show that a credit transfer is neither an equitable nor 
a statutory assignment of funds. 
There is an additional argument against it being a 
statutory assignment. Section 126 of the Property Law 
Actl952 has been held to be inapplicable to the assignment 
of part of a debt. 23 Yet the transfer of the whole 
debt would be an extremely rare occurence under the credit 
transfer system. 
In truth, the law of assignments is not necessary to 
explain the credit transfer system. Much more in accord 
with the expectations of the parties is the simple agency 
model suggested above. 
(3) Revocation and the Reversal of Accounts; 
The Problem of Finality 
As was noted above, the banks claim the right to dis-
oonour a cheque and reverse the accounts up until about 
40 hours after the accounts have originally been debited 
and credited. They further claim the right to reverse 
23. Williams v. Atlantic Assurance Co [1933) K.B. 81, Walter and 
Sullivan Ltd v. Murphy and Sons Ltd [1955) 2 Q.B. 584. 
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the accounts of a credit transfer for an unspecified 
period of time after the initial crediting and debiting 
accounts. Presumably the customer is considered to 
have the right of countermand at any time until the banks 
lose their right to reverse the accounts. 
It is easy to be innocently led into circularities in 
considering these problems. 
24 However, it seems 
impossible to imagine a situation in which the bank's 
right to countermand payment should not be determined 
at the same time. It seems reasonable to call the time 
of this determination the time of final payment. Even 
further, there seems little reason not to follow every 
day terminology and merely call it the time of payment 
on the simple understanding that payment is not made until
 
/ it is final. Note that we are really concerned wit
h two 
similar but conceptually distinct problems. Firstly, when
 
does a paying banker pay on a cheque. Secondly, when A, 
J 
in order to pay B, gives instructions to his bank to effec
t 
such a payment, when is it completed. Also note that 
a payment may be "final" in the sense used above even thou
gh 
it is a conditional payment. When A hands Ba cheque, 
payment is made at the time of the handing over, even thou
gh 
that payment is conditional upon the cheques being honoure
d. 
24 . For example, "If money transfer entries can be revers
ed, when 
are they paid?" "When the right to reverse such an entry 
is 
lost." 
31 
The question of finality of payment has been discus
sed 
in a series of shipping and banking cases which wi
ll be 
discussed below. Before discussing these cases, ho
wever, 
a few preliminary observations will be made. 
Firstly, it is clear that p~yment may be made by th
e 
accounting procedure of crediting the creditor's ac
count 
and debiting the debtor's account. 
25 On the other 
hand, there is no authority for the proposition th
at mere 
debiting and crediting of accounts amounts to paym
ent. 
Secondly, the structure of the New Zealand system b
lurs 
the distinction between "in-house" and "out-house" 
payments, 
a distinction which has been sometimes seen as imp
ortant 
in the English cases. The Databank procedure for c
learing 
cheques and for making cred i t trans fe rs is used in 
all 
cases. Particularly in the case of a credit trans
fer, 
this system resembles an "in-house" p ayment, even w
hen 
the paying bank and the recipient bank are differen
t. 
Finally, it would appear that the case of Re k stin v
. Sev e ro 
Sib e rsko Gosvdarstv e nnoe Akcionern o e 
26 has been 
interpreted far too widely. Not only have the fact
s of 
the case been misunderstood, possibly because the h
eadnote 
is somewhat misleading, but also certain distinguis
hing 
features of that very peculiar case have not receiv
ed 
sufficient attention. 
25. Eyles v. Ellis (1827) 4 Bing. 112. 
26. (1933] 1 K.B. 47. 
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The most recent case concerned with the payment question 
is Momm 
27 
v. Barclays Bank International Ltd. 
In that case, Kerr J. reviewed and interpreted most of 
the cases on payment. The judgment of Kerr J. will be 
outlined in the following paragraphs, and the facts of 
each case will be explained as they arise for discussion. 
The facts of that case were as follows : The plaintiffs 
were a German banking partnership. They entered into a 
contract with another German bank, Herstatt, which provided, 
inter alia, that Herstatt transfer to the plaintiff's 
account at the defendant's bank some E 120,000 in sterling. 
The transfer was to be on the basis of "value June 26, 1974" 
which meant that the payment had to be made on that date. 
It happened that Herstatt also had an account with the 
defendant bank and intended to make the payment from that 
account, but that was not part of the contract between 
Herstatt and the plaintiff. Herstatt accordingly ordered 
the defendant to transfer the sum from Herstatt 's account to 
the account of the plaintiff on June 26. 
The defendants made this transfer on June 26 by altering 
the accounts, even though this placed Herstatt's account 
in an overdrawn position. The decision to do so was 
made by an appropriate officer of the defendant bank. The 
accounts were thus processed by the defendant bank's com-
puter that night. The next morning, the defendant bank 
27. [1976] 3 All E.R. 588. 
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became aware that Herstatt had ceased trading. Upon 
receipt of this information, they informed the plaintiff, 
in response to an inquiry, that the transfer had not 
been made, "due to the present position of Herstatt's 
accounts", and they took steps which resulted in the 
computer reversing the accounts. The plaintiffs then 
sued, claiming a wrongful debiting of their account of 
the amount in question; the defendants, relying on 
Rekstin, 
28 claimed by way of defence that the 
transfer would only have been complete upon the plaintiffs 
receiving notice of it, and that account entries do not 
constitute such notice. 
Kerr J. thought that, as a matter of principle, when a 
credit transfer is to be effected by a bank on a given 
"value date", then the position at the end of the day 
must be certain, that the bank could not delay its decision 
to credit until the next day. That principle, which is 
merely an application of the general principle that the 
banker must follow his instructions strictly, does not 
settle the matter, for the question still remains as to 
whether the bank in fact followed the instructions, in 
which case the plaintiff would win, or whether the bank 
did not do so, in which case the plaintiff could have no 
claim against the bank. 
28 . [1933] 1 K.B. 47. 
34 
Kerr J. found for the plaintiff on the basis of the old 
case of Eyles v. Ellis. 
29 
inguish and explain Rekstin 
30 
He then went on to dist-
reinforcing his view 
of that case by reference to recent Court of Appeal 
decisions in two shipping cases, The Brimmes 
31 and 
Mardorf Peach and Co Ltd v. Attica Carriers Corporation 
of Liberia. 32 Each of these cases, together with 
the analysis of Kerr J. and coroment upon that analysis, 
will be discussed in turn. 
Eyles v. Ellis 33 The plaintiff was a creditor of 
the defendant. Both parties kept accounts at the same 
bank. On a Friday, the defendant instructed the banker 
to transfer the sum owed to the account of the plaintiff. 
The banker did this by making the appropriate entry in 
his books, even though the defendant's account was then 
overdrawn. On that same day, the defendant wrote to the 
plaintiff to inform him that the transfer had been ordered, 
but the letter did not reach the plaintiff until Sunday. 
Meanwhile, on the Saturday the banker had failed. The 
court found for the defendant, observing that the plaintiff 
could have drawn for the sum and the banker could not have 
refused his draft. 
29. (1827) 4 Bing. 112 
30. [1933] 1 K.B. 47. 
31. [1975] Q.B. 929. 
32. [1976] Q.B. 835. This case was reversed on appeal to the House of 
Lords : "The Laconia", The Times, February 7, 1977. However the 
principles relating to time of payment do not seem to have been 
altered by the House of Lords. 
33. (1827) 4 Bing. 112. 
34. Kerr J. observes, rightly it is submitted, that the sending of the 
letter cannot be notice. It is actual notice which is required. 
34 
•• •• 
• 
35 
Kerr J. observes that "the important feature of the case 
is that the payment was held to be complete when the 
payee's account was credited and before the payee had had 
any notice that this had happened." He held that, on the 
facts,Eyles v. Ellis 
35 was indistinguishable from 
Momm. 
36 
It is not to be supposed that Kerr J. was suggesting the 
above statement to be the ratio of Eyles v. Elli s . 
37 
It is important to notice a further feature of the case 
the judgment of the court, given by Best C.J., clearly 
assumed that the bank had been given explicit authority 
to recieve the money on behalf of the plaintiff. That 
this was indeed the case is evidenced by the fact that 
the transfer in question was a result of a complaint by 
the plaintiff that an earlier transfer had not taken 
place as it was supposed to have. 
Also note that Kerr J. refers only to the crediting of 
the payee's account. This, in itsel f , is, of course, not 
decisive of the time of payment, since it has long been 
the custom of banks to credit the account of a payee of 
a cheque upon deposit while reserving the right to debit 
the account if the cheque is dishonoured upon presentment 
to the pay ing bank. Such a practice was held to be valid 
35. (1827) 4 Bing. 112. 
3 6 . [ 19 7 6 ] 3 All E . R . 5 8 8 . 
37. (1827) 4 Bing. 112. 
36 
in AL Underwood Ltd v. Bank of Liverpool 
38 in spite 
of earlier confusion caused by Capital and Counties Bank Ltd v. 
Gordon. 
39 
Kerr J. then had to deal with the claim of the defendant 
bank, based on counsel's interpretation of Rekstin 
40 
that no transfer could be complete until notice was given 
to the transferee. 
Rekstin : 
41 There were two defendants in Rekstin, 
the first was a Russian trading organisation commonly 
referred to as "Severo''. The second was a bank at which 
Severo had an account. The plaintiff was a judgment 
creditor of Severo. Severo devised a scheme to protect 
the contents of their bank account from a garnishee 
order. Severo ordered the bank to transfer the contents 
of their account to the account of the Russian Trade 
Delegation, who had an account with the same bank. The 
Trade Delegation had diplomatic immunity. The order was 
made without the knowledge or consent of the Trade Delegation. 
Upon receipt of the order, a clerk of the bank made the 
necessary book entries to close the Severo account, and 
prepared a "credit slip" which was preparatory to crediting 
the Delegation's account with the same sum. Before such 
a credit entry was made, however, the plaintiff served the 
38. [1924] 1 K.B. 775. 
39. [1903] A.C. 240. 
40. (1827) 4 Bing. 112. 
41. [1933] 1 K.B. 47. 
•• •• 
• 
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bank with a garnishee order nisi in respect of the judgment 
against Severo. 
The court held, inter alia, that the mandate from Severo 
to the bank to transfer the money to the account of the 
Trade Delegation was, in the circumstances, still revocable 
and was, in fact, revoked by operation of law upon receipt 
of the garnishee order nisi. 
Counsel for Barclays in the Momm 
42 
to define the ratio _ of the Re k stin 
43 
case attempted 
case in terms 
of notice, asserting that transfer is incomplete until 
actual notice is recieved by the transferee. He might 
be forgiven for supposing that this line of argument 
would be readily accepted, for that seems to have been 
the accepted interpretation ever since the cour t explained 
Rek stin 
44 in those terms in Co nti nent a l c a u o u tchc u c 
and Gutta Per c ha Co v. Kleinwort Sons & Co. 
45 
Kerr J., however, rejected this statement as the ratio 
of Rekstin 
46 on the grounds that it is inconsistent 
with the decision in Eyles v. Ellis 47. He further 
observed that Eyles v. Ellis was not mentioned in either 
the Rekstin case or the Continental Ca u o u tchouc 
50 case . 
Kerr J. suggests that the basis of the Re k stin 
51 decision 
42. (1976] 3 All E.R. 588. 
43. (1933] 1 K.B. 47. 
44. (1933] 1 K.B. 47. 
45. (1904) 90 L.T. 474, 
46. (1933] lK.B.47. 
47. (1827) 4 Bing. 112. 
48. (1827) 4 Bing. 112. 
49. (1933] 1 K.B. 47. 
so. (1904) 90 L.T. 474. 
51. (1933] 1 K.B. 47. 
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is one of two propositions. First, that there had been 
no final appropriation of the money to the credit of 
the Trade Delegation. Secondly, " ... the fact that the 
Trade Delegation knew nothing of the proposed transfer, 
that there was no transaction between Severo and the 
delegation underlying it, and that the delegation had 
accordingly never assented to its account being credited 
with these moneys." 
With respect, the first of these begs the question in 
that finality of the transaction is what the court had 
to decide in Rekstin. 52 It is, on its own, wrong, 
or at least misleading, in that later cases, as observed 
by Kerr J. later on, clearly indicate that payment may 
be completed prior to the completion of internal 
accounting procedures when the bank has authority to 
receive the payment. 
53 
The second basis given by Kerr J. might be summarised by 
the proposition that the bank was not the agent of the 
Trade Delegation for the purposes of receiving this payment. As 
will be noted below, the House of Lords decision in 
The Laconia 54 shows that payment is not completed 
in such a situation. 
Indeed, on a common sense approach, the bank in Rekstin 
55 
52. [1933] 1 K.B. 47. 
53. In particular, the clerk had decided to act on the order. Payment 
would have been complete had the bank been authorised to receive 
the sum on behalf of the Trade Delegation. 
54. The Times, February 7. 1977. 
55. [1933] 1 K.B. 47. 
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was a complete stranger to the Trade Delegation insofar 
as this particular transfer was concerned. It is as 
though Severo had ordered a new account to be opened in 
the name of the Trade Delegation in some far off bank. 
That the Trade Delegation might have an account at the 
bank is clearly irrelevant. 
Kerr J. then discussed two shipping cases concerning 
time of payment. In both, the owners were purporting 
to exercise their right of withdrawal of the ship in 
default of prompt payment by the charterers. The first, 
The Brimnes , 56 is of direct relevance, being an 
"in-house'' payment. The second, Mardorf Peach & Co Ltd v. 
Attical Sea Carriers Corporation of Liberia, 
57 has 
since been reversed by the House of Lords; it seems, 
however, that much of the Court of Appeal's comments on 
time of payment remain good law. These cases may be 
summarised very briefly for the present purposes. 
The Brimnes : 
58 The contract called for the charterers 
to make monthly payments into the account of the owners at 
the Morgan Guaranty Trust Co of New York (MGT). Payments 
were effected in the following manner: The charterers 
would instruct their bank, Hambros, to make the payment; 
Hambros, who also had an account with MGT, would send a 
Telex message instructing MGT to make the appropriate transfer 
56. [1975] Q.B. 929. 
57. [1976] Q.B. 835. 
58. [1975] Q.B. 929. 
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occasion in question, the Telex message arri~ed at MGT 
at 4.53 am, New York time, but was not dealt with until 
approximately noon of that day. In the meantime, it 
was found by the court, the owners had exercised their 
right of withdrawal. 
The court rejected arguments that payment had been made 
either at 4.53 am or at 9.00 am when MGT opened for 
business, for to do so would be to elevate Telex messages 
to the status of negotiable instruments. The Court 
held that payment had not been made at the time of the 
purported withdrawal. 
It was not necessary for the court to decide when payment 
had been made, but each of the Judges spoke to this point. 
Kerr J. notes that "all the members of the Court of Appeal 
clearly considered that payment was complete when MGT 
decided to credit the shipowner's account and acted on 
that decision." While that is correct, it is, with 
respect, a simplification. Each of the Judges considered 
that payment was complete when the creditor had credit 
available on which he could unconditionally draw: on the 
evidence that time was found to be that stated by Kerr J. 
The Laconia: 59 Payment in this case was made by 
means of a bank "payment order". This was an "out-house" 
payment. The Court of Appeal held that payment was 
59. 1be Times, February 7, 1977. 
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complete at the time when the receiving bank accepted 
the order and decided to act upon it, irrespective of 
the time which had to elapse before the bank's internal 
accounting processes had been completed. 
The House of Lords reversed the Court of Appeal, 
observing that the bank was not authorised to receive 
the particular payment on behalf of the owners. The 
observations of the Court of Appeal on the time of 
payment, had the receipt of such payment been authorised, 
were not challenged, and would seem to remain valid. 
Again, it should be noted that evidence of banking 
practice played an important role. 
( 4) Summary 
In Momm 60 Kerr J. puts forth the principle that 
when a credit transfer is to be effected by a banker 
on a given "value date", then the position at the end 
of the day in fact and in law must be that this has 
either happened or not happened, but that the position 
cannot be left in the air. He then examines cases to 
establish the consistency of this proposition with the 
case law. He concludes that payment was actually 
completed when the bank manager "decided to accept Herstatt's 
instructions to credit the plaintiff's account and the 
60. [1976] 3 All E.R. 588. 
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computer processes for so doing were set in motion." 
The principle which emerges from the cases is that 
payment is complete when the appropriate person decides 
to act upon the payment order and (possibly) acts upon 
that decision. This principle is subject to the 
following observations : 
(i) The proposition is not strictly speaking the 
ratio decidendi of any of the decided cases : In Momm, 
all of the accounting procedures had been completed; in 
The Brimnes 62 it was only necessary to decide tha
t 
the mere receipt of the Telex order was not completed 
payment; The Laconia 
63 was an "out-house" payment. 
However, the time of payment was carefully argued in each 
of the cases; an argument in favour of some other time 
of payment would need to be very persuasive to succeed. 
(ii) In each of the cases, bank practice was relevant 
but not always decisive. In The Brimnes, 
64 for 
example, the evidence of the bank established that there 
actually was a time of "decision" on the Telex message 
61 
and that such payments were not, as claimed by the charterers, 
the result of a "continuous processing". However, in 
Momm 
65 itself, the bank attempted to show that it 
was banking practice to reverse accounts on occasions on 
61. [1976) 3 All E.R. 588. 
62. [1975) Q.B. 929. 
63. The Times, February 7, 1977. 
64. [1975) Q.B. 929. 
65. [1976) 3 All E.R. 588. 
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the following day. Kerr J. may not have been entirely 
convinced of the pr0actice, no actual instances of such 
a reversal could be produced, but toward the end of his 
judgment it is clear that he did not accept such a practice 
as valid in any case. 
(iii) The rule only applies when the bank is authorised 
to receive payrnent on behalf of the payee. In this case 
of the money transfer services offered by Databank, this 
authority would probably be implied by the payee's giving 
to the payor the details of his account. 
(iv) In each of the cases, the accounting procedure 
followed the time of decision. In New Zealand, the 
accounting procedure is the first step in the process. 
It will be shown below that this may be relevant in the 
case of credit transfers. 
(v) The problem of obtaining evidence showing the 
exact time of payment is a difficult one under the above 
rule. Bankers might be advised to keep better records 
regarding the times of such "decisions". Each of the 
cases were "special'' payments in that the matter did 
indeed come before an officer of the bank for consider-
ation. In the vast majority of credit transfers this 
will not be the case. The accounts will be credited and 
debited, the payors account will cover the transfers, and 
the entire transaction will not, in fact, come to the 
explicit attention of any of the bank's employees. When, 
44 
in such a circumstance, is the "decision" made? There 
are only two possibilities The time when the accounts 
are changed or the close of the business day. The latter 
seems preferable, since until that time the bank clearly 
has the right to give the transaction special consideration 
and to "decide" in the above sense. 
(vi) The dicta are not clear concerning the need for 
actions upon the decision to pay. As a practical matter, 
it seems unlikely that proof of the decision could be 
made without pointing to some overt action, as the 
question is probably quite academic. 
(5) Application to the Databank System 
As mentioned above, the unique feature of the Databank 
system is that the accounting procedure precedes the 
decision to pay. 
In the case of a credit transfer to be paid on a certain 
day, the accounts are credited and debited the night 
before. The computer compares the ordered transfer with 
the state of the payee's account and with his overdraft 
facilities, if any. If there are inadequate funds, the 
transaction is ~lagged'' for the attention of an officer 
of the paying bank. It might be argued that if the 
transaction is not flagged then it should be considered 
paid at the time of alteration of the accounts. This 
argument presupposes that the computer contains all of 
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the relevant information as to the decision for payment, 
i.e., that it is in fact the computer that makes the 
decision to pay. There is no good reason, either in 
fact or in policy, to accept this assumption. 
A better approach is to consider that transactions are 
complete at the time of human consideration of them or 
when business has closed for the day in the case where 
they are never actually considered. This approach 
accords reasonably well with bank practice, it also 
receives a certain support from dicta which argue that 
the speed or slowness of the bank's internal accounting 
procedure should not be the determining factor as to 
time of payment. There seems no good reason to deprive 
the banks of the right to decide on payments merely 
because they use an efficient accounting system, partic-
ularly when that accounting procedure accomplishes the 
desirable end of reducing the "float" and thereby 
inhibiting the "kiting" of cheques. 
As applied to the New Zealand system, the rule as to 
time of payment is similar to the rule in the Uniform 
Corrunercial Code. There, an item is finally paid, when 
the payer bank completes the process of posting to the 
account of the person to be charged therewith. 
66 
The Code defines the process of posting as the usual 
66. Uniform Commercial Code, Art. 4, 213 (c). 
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procedure followed by a payor bank in determining to pay 
an item and in recording the payment. 
67 Thus, under 
the UCC, the internal procedure of the bank is relevant 
to the terms of the payment and the time of payment 
under the UCC rule would always be later than that of 
the English rule when applied to the English system, 
i.e. when the decision precedes the accounting. Banks 
are, of course, under a duty to follow a reasonable 
system of accounting. 
(6) Failure to Credit and Late Credits 
The failure to effect a direct credit is a breach of 
contract on the part of the paying bank. Damages for 
such a breach would presumably be similar to those awarded 
for wrongful dishonour of a cheque, unless it may be 
shown that failure to effect a direct credit is soreehow 
more or less damaging to the customer's credit than a 
cheque dishonour. It might be argued that failure to 
effect a standing order is not as damaging as a cheque 
dishonour since it might be regarded more as an 
''accident" or mere absent-mindedness on the part of an 
account holder who has insufficient funds to meet a 
standing order. On the other hand, whereas a cheque 
may be dishonoured for reasons which do not damage the 
customers credit, e.g. irregularity on the face of a 
67. Uniform Commercial Code, Art. 4, 109. 
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cheque or suspicion of the validity of the customer's 
signature. The range of reasons for which the bank might 
fail to credit are much more restrictive. 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the principles 
relating to the measure of damages are the same; in 
particular, the bank will be liable for damage to the 
credit of the customer. 
68 This damage may be 
greater if the "dishonoured" transaction is a small one 
rather than a large one; 
69 in the case where the 
customer is a businessman, it is likely that large 
damages may be awarded without proof of actual damage to 
the customer; others will probably need proof of special 
damage. 70 
( 7) Libel 
The practice of banks of noting the reasons for dishonour 
of a cheque on the cheque itself has led to banks being 
sued in libel. Indeed, the quest for an innocuous phrase 
which is informative without being libelous is one of the 
more entertaining parts of the law of banking. 
71 
In the case of a wrongful failure to credit, there is, 
or may be, no document. There is no "dishonour" in the 
same sense as in a cheque which is not paid; there is a 
68. Since this is damage which flows directly and naturally from the 
breach of contract : Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex. 354. 
69. Marzetti v. Williams (1830) 1 B. & 'Ad. 415 
70. Gibbons v. Westminster Bank Ltd [1939] 2 K.B. 882. 
71. Paget, The Law of Bankin~, 8th Ed., 309-312. 
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mere failure to carry out instructions. 
It would appear that the bank is safe from libel actions 
in the case of direct credits. Although it is here sub-
mitted that that is indeed the case, an argument to the 
contrary should be noted. It has been suggested that 
the mere dishonour of a cheque, when no explanation at 
all appears on the face of the cheque, might amount to 
defamation. 
72 The argument against this is that 
there have been cases where words on a dishonoured 
cheque have been held to be non-defamatory; 
73 how, 
it is asked, can a blank cheque be defamatory when one 
with writing is not. Yet, this is not entirely convincing
, 
for the words may "draw the sting" of the dishonour. 
Even if the dishonour of a cheque could be found defamator
y 
in itself, the case for holding a failure to credit to 
be defamatory is weaker, being an omission rather than 
the more positive act of dishonour. 
(8) The Action on the Cheque 
When a cheque is dishonoured, the payee has a right of 
action on the cheque itself. There is no similar right 
for a payee of a direct credit when the credit is not 
made. Again, there is no "dishonour"; payment is simply 
72. Allen v. London County and Westminster Bank (1915) 31 T.L.R.
 210. 
73. Flack v. London and South-Wales Bank Ltd (1915) 31 T.L.R. 33
4, 
but compare with Sterling v. Barclays Bank Ltd (1930) The Times, 
July 18. 
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not made. The payee is thus in a weaker position when 
accepting payment by direct credit rather than by cheque. 
However, the right of action on the cheque is a result 
of the historical identification of the cheque as a 
special form of a bill of exchange. There would appear strictl 
to be no good policy reason for extending this right to 
a system of payment based solely on mandate. 
(9) Late Credits 
What should be the li ability of the bank in the case 
where a direct credit is made a day late, or, for that 
matter, a day early? There seems no rea son why the 
bank should not be held strictily to its mandate , much 
as in the case of the mandate of a cheque. On the other 
hand, there would appear to be no policy reason for 
allowing damages against the bank unless actual damage 
can be proved in cases of minimal breach. 
•• 
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C The Direct Debit System 
(1) Introduction 
The basic danger in a direct debit system is clearly the 
possibility of the creditor abusing his right to draw 
upon the creditor's account. This abuse is not limited 
to the case of out and out fraud, but extends to the 
case where there is a dispute between buyer and seller, w
here 
the buyer wishes to withhold payment pending resolution 
of the dispute but the seller debits the account of the b
uyer. 
These problems are, of course, governed by the contractua
l 
relationships among the parties. There seems to be only 
two basic solutions 
( i) The account is left debited and the 
debtor must look to the creditor for recovery, or 
(ii) upon the outbreak of a dispute, the 
bank returns the accounts to their original 
condition; the creditor looks to the debtor for 
satisfaction of the original debt. 
The Californian system has chosen the second solution. 
It seems the preferable one from the point of view of 
the bank, allowing it to keep the creditor/debtor dispute
 
at arms length. 
(2) Agency Aspects 
There are two basic legal models which might govern the 
relationships among the parties in the absence of well 
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defined contractual terms. The. two models yield quite 
different consequences in the case where the creditor 
overdebits the account of the debtor. 
In the first model, the bank is authorised by the debtor 
to pay certain of his debts. The contract between the 
creditor and the debtor contains a term, perhaps implied, 
whereby the creditor looks to the bank for payment of 
the debt. The bank is in the position of paymaster. 
In the second model, the creditor is the agent of the 
debtor with authority to draw upon the debtor's account 
with the bank. In thi~ model, the instructions to the 
bank to debit are seen as originating from the debtor via 
his agent, the creditor. The situation is analogous to 
that where an agent issues a cheque to himself as payee 
drawn on the principal's account. 
The two models give rise to different liabilities in the 
case of an overdebit. If the first model is the correct 
one, the bank has exceeded its authority as paymaster. 
The debtor may look directly to the bank for restitution 
of the over-debited amount. In the second model, the 
bank has followed its instructions properly;it is the 
creditor who has exceeded his authority and it is to the 
creditor that the debtor must look to recover the over-
debited amount. 
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There are several observations which suggest that the 
second model is preferable. Firstly, it fits the practice 
of existing systems better than the first model. In 
both the English Giro and the California automated clearing 
house system, the bank will place the accounts in their 
original position upon demand by the debtor. 
74 Both 
systems require indemnities from creditors wishing to use 
the direct debit system; 
75 there would be no need 
for such indemnities in the first model. Secondly, the 
second model avoids the fiction that the order to pay 
comes from the debtor. 
In practice, the liabilities of each of the parties should 
be carefully defined by the contract to avoid disputes. 
(3) Revocation 
Revocation of the creditor's right to draw upon the account 
may clearly occur at any time prior to payment. Revocation 
is effected, in either of the legal mode l s, by notice to 
the bank by the debtor. 
(4) Pr ocedural Sa f egua rds 
The direct debit system planned by the Databank system 
uses upper limits as a safeguard. Each direct debit 
order is compared against a pre-authorised limit; if the 
74. Homr igh a us e n, "One Large Step Towa rd Less-Ch e ch : The Califor
nia 
Automa t e d Cl e aring House Sy s t em" 28 Bus. Law 1143. 
75. Homri gh a usen, supra; Ch o rley, The Law of Banking. 
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limit is exceeded, the debit older is rejected. While 
this is undoubtably a sensible procedure, in times of 
rapid inflation it may lead to an inordinate amount of 
administration work as it becomes necessary to obtain 
new authorisations for more realistic upper limits. 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIV SITY OF WEU.INGfOr 
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D The Point of Sale System 
(1) Introduction 
The major problem to be considered here is the apport-
ionment of liabilities in the event of unauthorised 
use of the card. In practice, this should be carefully 
spelled out in the contracts. However, as the inter-
pretation of contracts often depends upon the nature of 
the relationship in the absence of the specific contractual 
terms, it is worth examining the legal framework of the 
point-of-sale system. The liability of the card-holder 
in negligence will then be briefly discussed . 
(2) Agency Aspects 
The apportionment of liabilities for the unauthorised 
use of the card must depend upon what is being authorised 
when the card is properly used. Again, two models 
present themselves for consideration. 
first model is that the point-of-sale transaction is 
a direct credit. By use of the card and his personal 
identification number, the consumer is authorising his 
bank to debit his account for the amount of the transaction. 
The retailer, by using a point-of-sale terminal for the 
transaction, authorises the bank to receive payment for 
him. Thus, in the event of an unauthorised use of the 
card, the bank is, in this model, acting without instruction 
from the customer and would be liable for the unauthorised 
debit to the customer's account. 
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The second model is that the point-of-sale transaction 
is a direct debit. If the direct debit is analysed as 
being a mandate from the customer to his bank to pay 
certain proper debts, then the result is the same as 
the first model. If, however, the direct debit is 
given the alternative interpretation, then the use of 
the point-of-sale card is an authorisation from the 
customer to the retailer. In this case, an unauthorised 
use of the point-of-sale card induces the retailer to 
act where no authority is present; it is the retailer 
who is then liable for the resulting loss. 
It is submitted that the first model is more in accordance
 
with the parties' intentions. Actual customer/bank 
contracts clearly contemplate that the bank will be 
primarily liable. The banks demand no indemnities from 
the retailer; indeed the major advantage of such systems, 
from the retailer's point of view, is that payment in 
assured at the time of the sale without the need to deal 
in cash or in cheques of doubtful validity. It may be 
that special rules as to account reversals should be 
legislated for point-of-sale transactions. The policy 
problem is to balance the interests of retailers on 
the one hand and consumers on the other. The issues 
involved are not too dissimilar to those which arise 
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from the use of bank credit cards. 
76 
(3) Negligence 
To what extent will the customer be liable for unauth-
orised use of his card, and personal identification 
number, which is caused by his negligence? The neglige
nt 
loss of a cheque book has been held to impose no liabili
ty 
on the owner, since that negligence is too remote from 
the loss caused when the finder forges a cheque. There 
is a stronger case for imposing liability in the case 
of the point-of-sale card : The card/number system is 
self-contained in that all of the safeguards against 
unauthorised use are present when the combination falls 
into the wrong hands. There is no need for the thief 
to add his own signature or identifying mark. 
It is an intriguing question whether contributory 
negligence might be ~raised as a defence by claiming 
that the bank had failed to implement technical safeguar
ds 
against the abuse of the system. 
be explored here. 
(4) Other Problems 
Tbe matter will not 
The point-of-sal~ terminals bring to a sharp f--ocus the 
76. There have been many articles written on the subject.
 A good 
history of the problem may be found in Lester, "Unauthoris
ed 
Use of Credit Cards and some Related Questions : What Pro
blems 
Remain?" 62 Ky. L. J. 881. 
I 
57 
twin issues of privacy and security. Widespread use 
of the terminals could easily permit the sort of 
surveillance illustrated in Appendix I. 
Further, since these terminals communicate directly 
with the main computer, the dangers of wiretappings and 
unauthorised entry into the system are severe. In spite 
of many bland assurances from politicians, safeguards 
are by no means foolproof or even adequate. 
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PART IV Appendix 
The following example of a hypothetical "daily 
surveillance sheet" shows the degree of privacy invasion 
possible under a total EFT system. Although parts 
of the "surveillance" are somewhat artificial, it is 
nevertheless very disquieting. The example is from 
Van Tassel, "Daily Surveillance Sheet, 1987, From a 
Nationwide Databank", 24 Computers and People 31. 
DAILY SURVEILLANCE SHEET - CONFIDE NTIAL - JULY 13, 19 84. 
SUBJECT: John Q Public, 4 Home Street, Anywhere, USA. 
Male, Age 40, Marri ed, Electrical Engineer. 
PURCHASES Wall Street Journal, $1.00; Breakfast, $2.25; 
Gasoline, $6.00; Phone (111-1234), $.25; Phone (222-5678), 
$.25; Lunch, $4.00; Cocktail, $1.50; Bank (cash withdrawal) 
$200.00; Lingerie, $135.67; Phone, (111-8769), $.85; Phone 
(869-1111), $.80; Bourbon, $12.53; Boston Globe, $.50. 
COMPUTER ANALYSIS : 
Owns stock (90 % probability). 
Heavy starch breakfast - probably overweight. 
Bought $6.00 gasoline. Owns VW. So far this week subject 
has bought $25.00 worth of gasoline. Obviously doing 
something besides driving 9 miles to work. 
Bought gasoline at 7.57 at gas station 6 miles from work. 
Subject probably late for work. Third such occurence this 
week. 
• • 
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Phone no 111-1234 belongs to Joe Book. Book was arrested 
for illegal bookmaking in 1970, 1978 and 1982. No convic-
tions. 
Phone no 222-5678 belongs to expensive men's barber shop 
specialising in hair restoration. 
Drinks during lunch. 
Withdrew $200 cash. Very unusual since all legal purchases 
can be made using Uniform Federal Funds Tranfer Card. Cash 
usually used for illegal purposes. 
Bought very expensive linge rie. Not his wife's size. 
Phone no 111-8769 belongs to Jane Doe. 
Phone no 869-1111. Reservation for Las Vegas (without wife). 
Third trip in last three months to Las Vegas (without wife) 
No job related firms in Las Vegas. Will scan file to see 
if anyone else has gone to Las Vegas at the same time and 
compare to subject's phone call numbers . 
Purchased Bourbon. Third bottle this month. Either heavy 
drinker or much entertaining . 
OVERALL ANALYSIS : 
Subject left work at 4.00 pm since he purchased Bourbon 
1 mile from his job at 4.10 pm. (opposite direction from 
his house). 
Subject brought newspaper at 6.30 near his house. Un-
accountable 2.5 hours. 
Subject made three purchases today from young blondes. 
(Statistical 1 chance in 78) Probably has weakness for 
young blondes. (Jane Doe is a young blonde) 
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